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‘Rank-and-file movements and Political change before the Great War; the 






This article examines political change in the Durham coalfield, which sustained 
one of best established, largest and most influential Edwardian trade unions. It 
engages primarily with Duncan Tanner’s work, which remains the most 
influential account of the process of Labour’s supplating of the Liberals. 
Locating Tanner’s approach in the ‘New Political History’s’ emphasis on 
agency, it argues that the hitherto ignored rank-and-file movements’ size and 
significance (especially the Durham Forward Movement from May 1912) 
demands a central explanatory role. Re-inserting the rank-and-file movements 
into the ‘political change’ narrative offers a rather different perspective on many 
of the key debates around the period, most importantly on the nature and 
strength of the Independent Labour Party’s (ILP) challenge to the Liberal 
hegemony within the Durham Miners’ Association. Focussing on actors and 
agency in the context of the formal organizations through which they operated, 
the article argues that ILP leaders effectively articulated a radical ‘class’ 
language. Notwithstanding the militants’ institutional under-representation in 
the DMA, and continued rivalries between larger (modern) and smaller 
(effectively over-represented) lodges, the agency of a new, younger generation 
of emerging ILP activists, framing an appeal to miners’ material interests 
harnessed to a radical reforming agenda and support for Labour, meant that 
 
  
Labour’s prospects in the Durham coalfield by August 1914 were rather more 
positive than has been recognised.  
 
Introduction 
The Labour Party’s supplanting of the Liberals in the early twentieth century has 
provoked intense debate.1 Broadly speaking, two schools of thought emerged. 
The first (‘inevitabilist’ or ‘evolutionist’) regarded emerging (working-)class 
politics as responsible for marginalising the Liberals. This approach emphasised 
the class-based nature of Labour’s appeal, growing from a deep and solidarisitic 
class-consciousness evident in the integral role played by trade unions.2 It also 
highlighted the organisational strength of Labour’s nascent centralising machine 
before 1914 and its distinctive ideological appeal. The second (‘revisionist’ or 
‘accidentalist’) approach argued that the terminal split in the Liberal Party 
during the Great War allowed Labour to prevail.3 It emphasised the continued 
 
* Acknowledgements; Thanks are due to Kevin Davies for material, to particpaints at the Sixth 
Modern British History Network Conference (University of Stirling, 19-20 June 2012), the 
Ninth International Congress of Mining History (Johannesburg, April 2012) and ‘Revisiting the 
“Great Labour Unrest” (Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, September 2011) -especially Ralph 
Darlington, Sam Davies, Emmet O’Connor, Stefan Berger, Chris Wrigley and Andrew Thorpe- 
and to Gidon Cohen, Martin Pugh, Keith Gildart, Peter Mates and the anonymous referees for 
their comments on earlier versions of this article. 
1 For a useful overviews of the debates see K. Laybourn, ‘The Rise of Labour and Decline of 
Liberalism: The State of the Debate’, History 80:259 (1995), pp.207–226 and M. Roberts, 
Political Movements in Urban England, 1832–1914 (Basingstoke, 2009), pp.128–160. 
2 The classic text is R. McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910–1924 (Oxford, 
1974).  
3 See for example, P.F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971).     
 
  
ability of both old and ‘new liberalism’ to attract the working-class and 
Labour’s consequent continued electoral weakness before August 1914. 
  
Duncan Tanner’s Political Change and the Labour Party (1990) provided a 
qualified endorsement of the ‘revisionist’ approach.4 It came in the wake of a 
general postmodernist assault in the 1980s on Marxist-dominated labour history 
and its central explanatory concepts such as ‘class’. Tanner’s became an 
essential work in the postmodernist-influenced approaches of the emerging 
‘New Political History’ that decisively reject deterministic class-based 
sociological interpretations and instead emphasise the role of political language, 
ideology and (often) agency.5Tanner ambitiously detailed the political dynamics 
of all regions and industries, arguing that by 1914 ‘Labour had not developed 
 
4 D. Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900–1918 (Cambridge, 1990).  
5 Steve Fielding delineated a ‘New Labour History’ as an adjunct of the ‘New Political History’ 
in 2002. Arguably, some of Fielding’s ‘[New] New Labour History’ of the 2000s differs little 
from the original ‘new labour history’ (‘history from below’) developed in the 1960s by E.P. 
Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm and others in terms of its focus and general approaches. That said, 
the continued sociological determinism of Hobsbawm’s approach was quite clear in his famous 
1978 lecture ‘The Forward March of Labour Halted?’; the differences with historians influenced 
by post-structuralism clearly demonstrated in Stedman Jones’ 1983 response to Hobsbawm. S. 
Fielding, ‘“New” Labour and the “New” Labour History’ in Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für die 
Geschichte der sozialen Bewegungen, 27 (2002), pp.35-50 (see also in same volume A. Croll, 
‘The Impact of Postmodernism on Modern British Social History’, pp.137-152); E. Hobsbawm, 
M. Jacques, F. Mulhern, The Forward March of Labour Halted? (1981), pp.1-19; G. Stedman 
Jones, ‘Why is the Labour Party in such a mess?’ in Languages of Class (1983), pp.239-256. For 
the ‘New Political History’ see L. Black, ‘What kind of People are you?’ in J. Callaghan, S. 
Fielding and S. Ludlam (eds.), Interpreting the Labour Party (2003), pp.23–38.  
 
  
the ideological/political strength to support an expansionist strategy. It had not 
created a solid “class” vote […] It had not even the uniform support of trade 
unionists’.6 While Tanner’s study drew immediate criticism regarding some of 
his case studies, subsequent work has tended to endorse his basic argument.7  
 
Consequently, Liberal pre-1914 strength is now the general tenet, though there 
are two recent historiographical battlegrounds.8 First, Declan McHugh argued 
(contrary to Tanner) that the ‘progressive alliance’ in Manchester was ‘unlikely 
to have survived much longer regardless of the impact of war’.9 Second, Valerie 
Hall’s study of Northumberland miners’ consciousness undoubtedly suggested 
Labour strength before August 1914.10 Yet there remains much more to explore 
in local-regional and industry-specific case studies. This article re-examines the 
Durham miners. Foremost of the district miners’ unions (in terms of wealth and 
prestige), winning their allegiance away from the Liberals was crucial to the 
 
6 Tanner, Political Change p.317.  
7 Reviewers criticised Tanner’s treatment of parts of Yorkshire, Leicestershire and the Rhonda. 
Laybourn, ‘Rise of Labour’, p.221; S. Berger, ‘The Decline of Liberalism and the Rise of 
Labour: The Regional Approach’, Parliamentary History, 12:1 (1993), pp.85–6; B. Lancaster, 
‘The Rise of Labour’, Labour History Review, 57:3 (1992), pp.98–99. 
8 Liberal strength is argued in, for example, I. Packer, ‘Contested Ground: Trends in British By-
elections, 1911–1914’, Contemporary British History (2011), p.170 and M. Cole, ‘The Political 
Starfish: West Yorkshire Liberalism in the Twentieth Century’, Contemporary British History, 
25:1 (2011), pp.175–188. 
9 D. McHugh, ‘Labour, Liberals and the Progressive Alliance in Manchester, 1900–1914’, 
Northern History, 39:1 (2002), pp.93–108.  
10 V.G. Hall, ‘The anatomy of a changing consciousness: the miners of Northumberland, 1898-
1914’, Labour History Review, 66:2 (2001), pp.165–186.  
 
  
nascent Labour Party.11 And, indeed, the Durham miners moved rapidly from an 
apparently firmly entrenched liberalism to electing one of the first Labour-run 
County Councils in 1919. Durham was thus important in terms of its own 
influence on the national scene and also as an ‘extreme’ case study of a region 
that saw considerable and speedy political change. Furthermore, it was not 
entirely exceptional among British coalfield districts as the South Wales, 
Derbyshire, Yorkshire and Scottish coalfields, for example, were certainly 
experiencing similar tensions between fulltime often Liberal-inclined leaders 
and sections of their members in this period.12 While accepting, like Roy 
Gregory, that the Durham coalfield was one of the more advanced areas in terms 
of Labour’s growth, Tanner still highlighted the party’s relative weakness there 
before August 1914. But there is a significant gap in Tanner’s account: the 
omission of the rank-and-file movements and especially the Durham Forward 
 
11 In March 1912 the DMA had 121,805 members and £468,186 in funds. Of the MFGB 
affiliates, the DMA was second in size only to SWMF but with far superior finances (the SWMF 
had 135,553 members and £150,230 in funds). Durham Chronicle, 15 Mar. 1912; 26 July 1912.  
12 That said, the extent to which the ILP led rank-and-file movement in the Durham coalfield 
was exceptional remains unclear. C.L. Baylies, The History of the Yorkshire Miners, 1881–1918 
(1993), pp.367–397; J.E. Williams, The Derbyshire Miners: a study in industrial and social 
history (1962), pp.393–441; D.K. Davies, ‘The Influence of Syndicalism, and Industrial 
Unionism in the South Wales coalfield 1898–1921: A Study in Ideology and Practice’. Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Wales, 1991; D. Smith, ‘Tonypandy 1910: Definitions of Community’, 
Past and Present, 87 (1980), pp.158–184; C. Williams, Democratic Rhondda: Politics and 
Society, 1855–1951 (Cardiff, 1996); R. Page Arnot, South Wales Miners to 1914 (1967); A. 
Campbell, The Scottish Miners, 1874–1939 (2 vols.) (Aldershot, 2000).  
 
  
Movement (DFM), which drew mass support in the coalfield from May 1912.13 
This article argues that placing the DFM at the centre of discussion about 
political change in the Durham coalfield allows these complex processes to be 
more fully appreciated. In doing this, it lays the essential foundations for 
developing the first comprehensive and convincing account of how Labour 
came to predominate over the Liberals in County Durham.  
 
In examining the centrality of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) to the 
organisation of the rank-and-file movements in the coalfield, this article builds 
on David Howell’s approach to the ILP (to 1906), exploring the varied ways it 
developed in specific local and industrial contexts.14 It is also situated in recent 
historiographical developments that have sought to rehabilitate the role of the 
ILP in trade union politics (albeit in the rather different context of post-1932).15 
 
13 Tanner’s account drew considerably on Gregory’s earlier work, though the latter was more 
positive of Labour’s overall position in the Durham coalfield by 1914. Gregory, too, failed to 
mention the rank-and-file movements and his study is poorly referenced. R. Gregory, The 
Miners and British Politics, 1906–1914 (Oxford, 1968). 
14 Central to Howell’s approach was an emphasis on the importance of agency and locality in 
understanding the ILP’s importance. Since Howell, very many studies of the ILP have sought to 
examine it with local case studies. D. Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour 
Party 1888–1906 (Manchester, 1983). See also G. Cohen, ‘Myth, History and the Independent 
Labour Party’, in M. Worley (ed.), The Foundation of the British Labour Party: Identities, 
Cultures and Perspectives, 1900-39 (Farnham, 2009). 
15  See K. Gildart, ‘Coal Strikes on the Home Front: Miners’ Militancy and Socialist Politics in 
the Second World War’, Twentieth Century British History, 20:2, (2009), pp.121–151; G. 
Cohen, The Failure of a Dream: The Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World 
War II (2007) especially pp.54-62. 
 
  
Indeed, the ILP’s industrial activities in the Durham coalfield to 1914 suggest 
the party deserves considerably more than a ‘walk-on part’ in understanding 
Labour’s challenge after 1906. Furthermore, the rhetoric inspiring their rank-
and-file movements allows for insights into the notoriously ‘difficult to pin 
down’ nature of ILP local activist ideology.16    
 
While recognising the importance of agency, the approach adopted in this article 
accepts that certain socio-economic conditions were favourable to particular 
political discourses. It thus analyses the ways that political actors, operating 
through formal trade union (and other) organizations, interacted with 
structural/contextual conditions, arguing that they required formal organization 
to make their rhetorical appeals to discontented miners effective. Generally 
speaking, the emphasis on agency in the ‘New Political History’ has tended to 
favour ‘revisionist’ interpretations of Labour’s rise. But rejecting class-based 
sociological interpretations does not mean that social class is of no value as an 
explanatory mechanism, nor does reasserting the importance of agency 
necessarily favour interpretations emphasising pre-war Labour weakness.17 
Indeed, analysis of the DFM suggests that Labour-supporting miner activists 
were very successful in deploying a class-based rhetoric that resonated within a 
considerable constituency. This article begins by contextualising developments 
 
16 Cohen, ‘Myth’, p.108. 
17 Tony Adams noted that social class was significant in places like Manchester, but argued that 
a renewed emphasis on social factors did not mean that the rise of Labour was inevitable. T. 
Adams, ‘Labour Vanguard, Tory Bastion or the Triumph of New Liberalism? Manchester 




in the Durham coalfield to 1910. It then provides a brief narrative of the DFM to 
1914, before exploring the various ways in which the movement’s features, 
successes and shortcomings more fully explain the Labour challenge to 




Liberalism dominated the Durham coalfield both politically and economically in 
the late nineteenth century. Durham mining constituencies increasingly returned 
Liberals after 1885, the mining vote growing in many as the coalfield expanded 
eastwards towards the sea. The Durham Miners’ Association (DMA) played a 
major role in getting its members to vote Liberal. Similarly, the DMA endorsed 
liberal economic notions that miners’ wages should be tied to the price of the 
coal they produced. John Wilson, who, as general secretary from 1896, occupied 
the DMA’s most powerful official position, embodied the liberal hegemony. A 
Durham Liberal MP from 1885, Wilson staunchly advocated conciliation and 
arbitration (as miners and owners apparently had common interests in 
maintaining profitability), opposing strikes, socialism and Labour.18 The 
influential Durham Chronicle, the self-styled miner’s friend’, enthusiastically 
endorsed Wilson’s position.19  
 
 
18 The Times, 25 Mar. 1915; J. Wilson, Memories of a labour leader: the autobiography of John 
Wilson, JP, MP (Durham, 1907). 
19 The Durham Chronicle did however produce verbatim communications from DFM and gave 




The Independent Labour Party (ILP), established in 1893, spearheaded an 
organised socialist challenge. By 1907, after a faltering start, the Durham 
coalfield was an ILP stronghold, especially in Chester-le-Street constituency.20 
There were also electoral advances for Labour (though not necessarily for 
‘socialism’). Most importantly, Arthur Henderson won Barnard Castle in a 1903 
by-election and J.W. Taylor took Chester-le-Street (with a 50 per cent mining 
population) from the Liberals in 1906.21 An apparently significant advance in 
the ILP’s campaign to sever the DMA’s links with the Liberals and forge new 
ones with Labour came in late 1907 when union members voted to join the 
Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) by a 3:1 majority. The DMA had 
been outside the MFGB as it opposed Federation policies on the eight hour day 
(the most influential grades of Durham miner, the hewers, already worked a 
seven hour day). The following year the MFGB voted to affiliate to the Labour 
Party; more ILP activists were being elected for a year’s service to the DMA’s 
Executive and the radical Liberal full-time official, Alderman William House, 
converted to Labour.22 By late 1909, the ILP appeared to be emerging 
triumphant. Two more Labour supporters, James Robson (1911) and William 
Whiteley (1912) were then elected full-time officials in quick succession.  
 
 
20 Howell, British Workers, pp.45–49; C. Marshall, ‘Levels of Industrial Militancy and the 
Political Radicalisation of the Durham Miners, 1885–1914’, Durham Univ., MA thesis, 1976, 
pp.194, 198.  
21 Gregory, Miners, p.96; Tanner, Political Change, p.216; Marshall, ‘Industrial Militancy’, 
p.157.  
22 J. Saville, ‘William House’, in J.M. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds), Dictionary of Labour 
Biography, Vol.2 (1974), p.186. 
 
  
Yet the cause of independent Labour representation in the DMA was actually in 
a weaker position than first appeared. The guileful John Wilson ensured that the 
DMA’s members did not, unlike the other districts, actually vote on whether the 
MFGB should affiliate to Labour. This allowed Wilson to continue as a ‘Lib.-
Lab.’ MP, standing unopposed in 1910. It also muddied the waters regarding the 
DMA’s position on election candidates and it did not formally support any 
candidates in 1910.23 Under Wilson’s influence, the DMA became a powerful 
conservative force inside the DMA, resisting its demands for a minimum wage 
and then putting obstacles in the way of achieving a majority for strike action on 
the issue in 1911. The onus was still on radical lodges to force their Liberal-
dominated leadership to act more radically inside the MFGB as well as to alter 
the DMA’s constitution to formally commit it to exclusive support for Labour 
candidates. But an attempt to do this in December 1911 was defeated in a lodge 
vote. Lodges had already rejected, in January 1910, a call for more MFGB-
sponsored Labour candidates in Durham after a reluctant Executive argued that 
the financial burden of the measure would fall on lodges.24 The ILP-led radicals 
also needed to find mechanisms to exercise better control over their fulltime 




23 Tanner, Political Change, p.215. 
24 D[urham] [R]ecord [O]ffice, D/DMA 30, Council Meeting, 22 Jan. 1910; D/DMA (Acc: 




Table showing general election results in mining constituencies (10 per cent 
plus of the electorate) in County Durham, 1906-191025   
 
 
The 1910 general election results further dented Labour hopes. Labour held five 
mining (or part mining) constituencies in Durham and contested a sixth.26 By 
December 1910, Labour had recorded a net loss of two MPs to the Liberals 
including losing Jarrow (with miners comprising 20 per cent plus of the 
electorate). The context was a backlash against the DMA’s settlement over the 
Eight Hours Day legislation. DMA officials had agreed without lodge 
consultation that the owners could implement a three-shift system, which was 
very unpopular for the dislocation it brought to miners’ family lives.27 Mass 
unofficial strikes against the agreement ensued in January 1910 and the DMA 
leadership very narrowly survived a lodge ‘no confidence’ vote on the issue. 
Two DMA officials standing for Parliament in January 1910 were faced with 
riotous protests: one, John Johnson (elected a Liberal in 1904 but who had since 
taken the Labour whip), lost his Gateshead seat and House, standing for Labour 
in Bishop Auckland, also suffered. These developments put the ILP, an advocate 
of the eight hour day, in serious difficulties. Indeed, the strikes of early 1910 
 
25 From data in W. Field, British Electoral Data, 1885-1949 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: 
UK Data Archive [distributor], November 2007. SN: 5673 and Gregory, Miners. 
26 Johnson stood as a Labour candidate in Gateshead in 1910 but lost. Henderson and Taylor 
twice held Barnard Castle and Chester-le-Street respectively. In two-member Sunderland, John 
Summerbell lost a Labour seat in January but F.W. Goldstone won one back in December.  
27 W.R. Garside, The Durham Miners, 1919–1960 (1971), pp.19–26. 
 
  
heralded –in the Durham coalfield as elsewhere– a period of industrial unrest 
that potentially brought problems for Labour. Revolutionary syndicalists began 
claiming that the organised working-class could achieve all its aims in the 
industrial sphere without the need for Parliamentary representation. The main 
published accounts highlighted further Labour electoral failures after 1910 in the 
Durham coalfield, suggesting that 1909 was the high-tide before decline 
abruptly set in. Yet none of these accounts attached any importance to the post-
1910 focus of ILP activity within the DMA in terms of reinvigorated rank-and-




The DFM originated from the Minimum Wage Movement (MWM) which, 
invigorated by a rapidly rising cost of living with wages not keeping pace and 
by increasing trade union belligerency, had been agitating in the coalfield from 
August 1911. The DFM’s moment came after the rather hollow victory of the 
national miners’ strike that ended, after six weeks, in April 1912. The strike 
secured a miners’ minimum wage, but it was to be fixed at individual district 
levels rather than nationally. Four prominent MWM activists called a Durham 
rank-and-file conference for 4 May 1912, from which the DFM emerged.28  
 
These four signatories became the DFM’s main elected leaders. The two most 
prominently active were Jack Lawson and W.P. Richardson. Lawson (DFM 
assistant secretary and later secretary) was an ILP member from 1904 and, from 
 
28 Durham Chronicle, 8 Sep. 1911; 29 Dec. 1911; 12, 26 Jan. 1912; 1 Mar. 1912; 26 Apr. 1912.  
 
  
1910, checkweighman at Alma pit, near Chester-le-Street. Checkweighmen, 
voted for and funded by miners to make sure all were being paid the full amount 
for the coal they mined, were widely respected. W.P. Richardson (DFM 
chairperson) was, by 1910, chair of Gateshead ILP district and lodge secretary 
of Usworth, Washington.29 Richardson was very unusual in the front ranks of 
DFM leaders in not being a checkweighman. The other two main leaders, 
Andrew Temple (DFM secretary) and Henry Bainbridge (DFM treasurer), were 
checkweighman at Twizell (very near Lawson’s pit) and Shield Row (West 
Stanley) respectively.30 The vast majority of the second ranking activists in the 
DFM were also checkweighmen, including figures such as James Gilliland 
(Ouston ‘E’, Birtley), Joseph Batey (St. Hilda), J. Herriotts (Windlestone), and 
John. E. Swan (Delight pit, Dipton).31 The movements’ main platform speakers, 
if they were not checkweighmen, were invariably lodge officials. The DFM was 
thus, through its leading figures, very firmly embedded in DMA lodges. The 
term ‘rank-and-file’ remains appropriate to describe their movements, however, 
as they remained firmly critical of, and in opposition to, the DMA’s fulltime 
elected leaders. Other historians of the coalfield, such as Dave Douglass, have 
used this terminology to express the same oppositional relationship between 
lodge leaders (and members) and fulltime district officials.32  
 
29 Durham Chronicle, 8 September 1911; 12 April 1912; C. Marshall, ‘Levels of Industrial 
Militancy and the Political Radicalisation of the Durham Miners, 1885–1914’ (unpub. MA 
Thesis, Durham Univ., 1976), F4. 
30 Lawson, Man’s Life, pp.74, 95–111, 116–120. Durham Chronicle, 6 September 1912. 
31 Durham Chronicle, 20 March 1914. 
32 As discussed below, the relationship became more complex when rank-and-file movement 




The DFM represented an important advance in the Durham rank-and-file 
agitation. First, it adopted a more concrete organisation than the earlier MWM, 
aiming to be ‘a permanent institution until our objects are accomplished..’.33 It 
had four officers and a committee of six and invited lodges to pay an affiliation 
fee (1s. per 100 members) and nominate for all posts, to be elected 
democratically.34 Second, the DFM’s activity, which revolved around organising 
mass meetings and conferences and issuing press circulars, was periodically as 
or more intense than that of its predecessor movement. It was also sustained for 
longer. Third, the DFM built on the hardcore of MWM supporting lodges, 
including the overwhelming majority of the largest lodges in the coalfield.35 
 
district leadership, albeit not remunerated. The relationship became even more complex again 
when, in 1915, the first rank-and-file movement leaders were elected fulltime officials 
themselves, not least because the DFM continued agitating. D. Douglass, ‘The Durham Pitman’, 
in R. Samuel (ed.), Miners, Quarrymen and Salt Workers (1977), pp.246–266. 
33 Durham Chronicle,  26 Apr. 1912. 
34 By July 1912, the organisation was formally named the ‘Durham Forward Movement’. In 
April 1914, DFM officials were up for re-election. DRO, D/DMA 327/6, Marsden Lodge Joint 
Meeting Minutes, 17 May 1914; Durham Chronicle, 10, 17 May 1912; 26 July 1912; 16 Aug. 
1912; 6 Sep. 1912; 1 May 1914;  
35 DRO, D/DMA (Acc: 2157(D)) 230 (vol), Oxhill Lodge Minutes, Ordinary Meetings, 31 Aug. 
1911; 23 Nov. 1911; 18 Jan. 1912; DRO, D/DMA (Acc: 2157(D)) 165 (vol), Andrew’s House 
Lodge Minutes, General Meeting, 2 Sep. 1911; 16 Nov. 1911; DRO, D/DMA 327/3, Marsden 
Lodge Minutes, Joint Meetings, 17 Dec. 1911; 4, 18 Feb. 1912; 28 Apr. 1912; Durham 
Chronicle, 8, 15, 29 Sep. 1911; 13 Oct. 1911; 10 Nov. 1911; 15, 29 Dec. 1911; 5, 12, 26 Jan. 
1912; 23 Feb. 1912; 1 Mar. 1912; 10 May 1912; 7 June 1912; 26 July 1912; 18 Oct. 1912; 31 
Jan. 1913; 23 May 1913; 15 Aug. 1913; 17, 31 Oct. 1913; 1 May 1914.  
 
  
While attendances fluctuated, the ‘large and enthusiastic’ crowd at an August 
1913 DFM meeting was broadly representative.36  
 
Fourth, the DFM broadened the MWM’s remit. It continued the thrust of earlier 
agitation, campaigning for amendments to the new Minimum wage Act and for 
improvements in miners’ wages and conditions outside the Act. But the DFM 
also moved more definitively onto the offensive on the more obviously 
‘political’ plane. Initially, it did this by moving against the DMA’s Liberal-
dominated leadership, through the DMA’s power structures. These require 
explanation: the DMA had five full-time officials in 1910 (rising to seven by 
summer 1913) who all sat on the Executive Committee. They were joined by 
another twelve lodge representatives for one year terms, with half being 
replaced every six months. The Executive Committee covered day-to-day 
decision making, but bi-monthly DMA councils were (theoretically at least) the 
DMA’s main decision-making body. The last council meeting of each year was 
the annual meeting and this took ordinary council business as well as overseeing 
the election of all full-time officials (normally a formality), and voting on 
amendments to the DMA’s rule book and standing orders. The DMA council 
voted on resolutions put by both the Executive and lodges. All votes -for full-
time officials, Executive representatives and on matters of policy at DMA 
council- were exercised by lodges. From 1884, lodges were allocated between 
one and six votes each depending on their memberships with any lodge with 750 
members or more possessing the maximum six votes.37 Full individual ballots of 
 
36 Durham Chronicle, 15 Aug. 1913.  
37 Marshall, ‘Industrial Militancy’, pp.105, 151. 
 
  
all DMA members were rare and only came when, for example, the DMA voted 
to join the MFGB or when voting on national strike action over the minimum 
wage in 1912. Effectively, considerable control resided at the top of the DMA; 
the Executive could decide to not let lodge resolutions appear at council 
meetings for example. The Executive, in turn, was controlled by full-time 
officials, still mostly Liberal and all in the thrall of Wilson, a very canny 
operator. By agitating for democratic reform of the DMA, the DFM aimed to 
wrest institutional control from the Liberals. The DFM’s inaugural conference 
suggested four specific proposals largely to empower individual members over 
full-time officials and to ensure lodge accountability. Soon after there came a 
short-lived DFM demand for a new DMA ‘propaganda and education 
department’ to inform members on policy and trade unionism and produce 
statistics to counter the coalowners.38 
 
To reform the DMA, lodges first had to vote in favour of amending the rule 
book in principle, before then submitting suggested changes. The lodges voted 
against rule changes in 1912, but in favour in 1913.39 In October 1913, a DFM 
meeting agreed to take ‘united action’ on five suggestions. The focus had shifted 
slightly from earlier proposals: there were no longer any suggestions on 
improving lodge accountability but three separate reforms aimed at more 
individual and lodge control of officials. There was also a new and highly 
 
38 Durham Chronicle,  17 May 1912; 26 July 1912; 23 Aug. 1912; 18 Oct. 1912.  
39 DRO, D/DMA 30, DMA Council Meeting, 12 July 1913; Durham Chronicle, 7 June 1912; 23 
May 1913.  
 
  
significant departure; a desire to alter the rule book to commit the DMA firmly 
to Labour.40  
 
The DMA’s annual meeting of December 1913 passed two of the DFM’s five 
suggestions. While a success rate of two from five seemed disappointing, the 
DFM was relatively effective compared to proposals fielded at the same annual 
meeting by lodges involved in the DFM that were not among the movement’s 
agreed aims.41 First, there was a new rule that all full-time officials be elected by 
an individual ballot of all members, thereby removing the vote from the lodge 
committees’ hands. Second, the union now had an additional object; ‘To 
promote and financially support Parliamentary candidates’ who had to be DMA 
members ‘and run solely under the auspices of the national Labour Party and be 
subject to its decisions if elected’.42 Securing the DMA’s unequivocal 
endorsement for Labour in December 1913 was the DFM’s most important 
achievement from its list of specific demands. True, the rule change came in the 
context of the MFGB’s agreement in autumn 1913 that its affiliates should 
endorse independent representation, after the embarrassment of the Liberal-
supporting Derbyshire Miners’ candidate standing at the Chesterfield by-
election in summer 1913. Nevertheless, it was significant that all the suggestions 
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on this issue at the DMA’s annual meeting came from DFM lodges; the 
Executive remained noticeably silent and inactive.43  
 
Now it was unequivocally won institutionally, the DMA’s enormous prestige 
and resources could be brought to bear exclusively for Labour. The DFM (and 
MWM before it) had become the chief means for ILP activists to mobilise lodge 
opinion against the Wilson-dominated DMA leadership, simultaneously 
building and consolidating ILP influence in the lodges. But this was merely part 
of the DFM’s significance for political change before August 1914. The rule 
change was but further evidence of a power-shift within the DMA away from 




There are several ways in which the DFM had a wider significance for 
understanding political change in the Durham coalfield. The first relates to how 
ILP activists in the DFM effected the lodge mobilisation. There were two 
essential features to their rhetoric. Firstly, they deployed a militant and 
aggressive language of class war. The DFM’s May 1912 circular set the tone: 
‘to obtain a fair share of the fruits of our labour we must be aggressive… Better 
wages and improved conditions of labour come only when by the power of 
organisation we compel them, not before’.44 Secondly, the DFM invariably 
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allied its industrial militancy rhetoric with explicit support for the Labour 
Party’s project in Parliament. The May 1912 circular delineated the DFM’s two-
pronged strategy of working through the MFGB ‘on the industrial battlefield, 
and the National Labour Party in the political arena’.45 This was another 
development specific to the DFM, as the MWM before it had tended to ignore 
the Labour Party. DFM meetings repeatedly emphasised the need for activity 
through the Labour Party, urging miners to run Labour candidates at local 
elections and to vote (under the new Trade Union Act) in favour of using trade 
union funds for political purposes (i.e. funding the Labour Party).46 As Jack 
Lawson remarked in August 1913, ‘the workers must realise that whether they 
liked it or not trade union questions were now political questions’.47 The 
successful December 1913 DMA rule change was the logical outcome of this 
rhetoric. While securing the DMA’s exclusive support for Labour was not one 
of the DFM’s original proposed reforms, it is clear that the DFM was by far the 
most significant vehicle for conveying the ultimately triumphant arguments on 
this issue. Perhaps, in May 1912, ILP activists simply had not anticipated quite 
how effective –in this particular respect, at least– the DFM could be. 
 
Naturally, there was a fine balance to strike between political and industrial 
agitation, evident in a DFM circular of November 1912; ‘We do not encourage 
the delusion that Trade Union action can bring about the millennium, but we are 
convinced that unless Trade Unionists take up an aggressive attitude on 
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particular questions, which affect their living and working conditions, they will 
go backward in these things’.48 In terms of the relations between action on the 
two planes, DFM activists (theoretically at least) saw no contradiction between 
employing industrial action to help force through political measures in 
Parliament (as occurred, of course, during the national Minimum wage strike). 
Certainly, there was no public indication of DFM activist discontent with the 
Labour Party’s performance in Parliament. While Tanner documented north-east 
ILP activists citing national compromise as an obstacle to them organising 
locally, no DFM activist criticised publicly Labour in Parliament for its timidity 
or for working with the Liberals.49 Indeed, DFM supporting-lodges tended to 
retain a faith in both Parliamentary action and the Labour Party and seemed to 
be looking for reasons to praise Labour in Parliament.50 This was strengthened 
when Labour MPs attempted to alter the Minimum Wage Bill in Parliament 
before voting against it during its third reading. Marsden miners, for example, 
praised the ‘indefatigable efforts’ of Labour MPs ‘endeavouring to make the bill 
workable and acceptable’.51 There was something of a symbiotic relationship 
developing, with Labour MPs’ actions further strengthening the DFM’s platform 
inside the DMA. In May 1912 the local ILP organiser claimed that Labour MPs’ 
actions over the Minimum Wage Bill had given the movement in the north-east 
‘more power than at any time during the last ten years. The work done on this 
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measure alone would justify the presence of the Labour Party in Parliament’.52 It 
is possible that Durham activists in particular were further appeased because 
Labour did fight by-elections against Liberals in the coalfield. As part of a 
national strategy, MacDonald began endorsing challenges to Liberals in the 
coalfields, in part to clear up confusion over Lib-Labism. In spite of his 
determination to stick with the Lib-Lab pact, even MacDonald saw scope for 
Labour’s advance.53 
 
In practice, the DFM’s inability (perhaps combined with some reluctance) to 
pursue its aims through self-contained industrial action invariably threw the 
onus onto Labour in Parliament. By April 1914, the shift in emphasis firmly 
towards political action was effected. Thus, while the DFM expressed 
enthusiasm for the nascent industrial triple alliance, its own strategy now firmly 
emphasised the political path to redemption: ‘if the workers would be free they 
must fight together industrially and politically. Voting is easier and more 
effective than fighting’ [my emphasis].54 The DFM began concertedly 
encouraging miners to interrogate their Parliamentary candidates about the 
miners’ Minimum Wage Act, which was due for amendment before they would 
vote in an anticipated 1915 general election. A June 1914 DFM circular outlined 
this strategy arguing that ‘we can strike surer at the ballot box on this question 
than in any other way; therefore we say “Strike”’.55 DFM leaders must have 
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anticipated that Labour candidates would appear more attuned to miners’ needs 
than their Liberal counterparts. That an MFGB deputation failed to convince 
Asquith to include the hitherto excluded mine surfaceworkers in any amended 
Minimum Wage Act in March 1914 surely suggested that DFM leaders’ low 
expectations of the Liberals were well founded.56 It was no coincidence that the 
emphasis in the DFM’s dual strategy shifted decisively after securing DMA 
support for Labour in December 1913. With the institutional battle for support 
for the Labour Party finally (and this time unequivocally) won, the next task was 
to find a mechanism to persuade DMA members to vote for Labour candidates.  
 
Recognising the DFM as a motor of political change provides new perspectives 
on a second area, debates about the nature and role of ideology in terms of 
socialism’s challenge to liberalism. This terrain was important; Tanner 
emphasised the ‘ideological’, arguing that Durham miners’ traditionally held 
liberal economic understandings were broadly maintained throughout this 
period.57 The ILP’s campaign for the miners’ minimum wage constituted the 
major thrust of its challenge to liberal economic notions that wages should be 
invariably tied to prices. In the spring 1912 votes on national strike action, 
around two thirds of Durham miners already consistently favoured some form of 
minimum wage.58 While this was not overwhelming, it still constituted a 
majority, in ballots conducted under complex and difficult conditions for 
minimum wage advocates. Furthermore, the DFM attacked outright the liberal 
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notion held by DMA leaders like Wilson of the need for understanding and 
cooperation between owners and miners for mutual benefit. Its May 1912 
circular was clear that ‘Our interests and those of the owners are not identical; 
they never were and never will be’.59 Naturally, this fell short of a Marxist claim 
that owners’ and workers’ interests were necessarily entirely antagonistic, but it 
still cut across the coalfield’s apparent economic religion. That the DFM grew in 
size and influence immediately after the minimum wage strike suggested that 
more lodge activists and ordinary rank-and-file miners were being won to 
support for a proper minimum wage and away from liberal economics.  
 
But what of the nature and appeal of the ILP activists’ ideology? Tanner rightly 
emphasised the limited ‘social basis’ for an ILP appeal based on ‘ethical 
socialism’ in areas like County Durham.60 Instead, Tanner suggested that the 
politics of activists like Lawson and W.P. Richardson (and House) ‘more 
“Labour” than “Socialist”’.61 Indeed, ILP activists tended not to deploy the term 
‘socialism’ itself from DFM platforms. They did, however, on occasion 
articulate a clear  language of class war; in Lawson’s words that the miners 
‘would only get from the coal owners what they were compelled to give at the 
point of a sword’.62  
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Describing this rhetoric as ‘labourist’ (albeit of a militant form), rather than truly 
‘socialist’ stretches ‘labourism’ too far. While Lawson and Richardson 
advocated making working-class gains in Parliament, their rhetoric was plainly 
not ‘class collaborationist insisting in theory and usually endorsing in practice 
the unity of capital and Labour’.63 Ideologically speaking, this language drew a 
very sharp line between the likes of Lawson and John Wilson, even though, 
rather ironically, both had experienced similar conversions from young lives of 
gambling, drinking and excess to teetotal activity in the Chapel and the DMA.64 
Lawson’s support for measures like nationalisation, as well as his self-defining 
as ‘socialist’, surely placed him firmly in the socialist camp.  Naturally, some 
DFM activists may have indulged in a more militant rhetoric than they actually 
believed. But the key point is that they thought this rhetoric would resonate with 
their disgruntled audience and, moreover, that it actually did so. 
 
This also has implications for the influence of Methodism among DFM activists. 
A strong relationship is suggested by the ‘Forward Movement’s very name. The 
Welsh Methodist and Christian socialist Hugh Price Hughes led his radical 
‘Forward Movement’ in Wesleyan Methodism in the late nineteenth century and 
the later Durham rank-and-file movement’s meetings were in some respects 
reminiscent of a Methodist revival. But it was a very secular revival; while 
Lawson and other activists’ rhetoric sounded rather more like that of Hughes’ 
far more radical fellow Christian socialist, S.E. Keeble (who opposed the Lib-
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Lab. Pact, for example), it was striking that there were no allusions to Biblical 
themes in the rhetoric delivered from DFM platforms.65 The bulk of speeches 
were confined to the details of the movement’s various demands, with the 
occasional wider ‘class war’ rhetorical flourishes noted above. There were no 
examples of the kind of reference ILP leader Keir Hardie made to the ‘great 
working man’ Jesus of Nazareth at the 1910 Durham miners’ gala.66 Lawson 
was particularly interesting in this context, as his speeches from DFM platforms 
gave no indication that he was a Methodist lay preacher. Indeed, Lawson’s 
influences were rather varied in this period as he remained in contact with 
individuals from his time at Ruskin College whose politics was revolutionary. A 
C. Pattinson, for example, belonging to the revolutionary ‘class conscious 
proletarian element of the socialist party; none of your laborism for us’, wrote to 
Lawson from Canada in August 1912. Praising Lawson’s involvement in the 
DFM, Pattison asked for copies of two pamphlets; Lawson’s on the minimum 
wage and the South Wales syndicalists’ The Miners’ Next Step.67  
 
Lawson was not an isolated example either. Will Lawther, at the time a young 
secretary of the Chopwell ILP branch, recalled an indoor meeting in the village 
at which Vipond Hardy and Harry Bolton, both ‘sincere members of their chapel 
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and opposed to us’ converted to the ILP.68 Hardy, who was Chopwell lodge 
delegate, was soon a key local DFM activist and, by 1914, Bolton was inviting 
the militant Irish trade unionist Jim Larkin to visit Chopwell after he had spoken 
at the Durham miners’ gala.69 In sum, the movement’s rhetoric endorses 
Moore’s claims about the decline in Methodism’s political influence as well as 
suggesting that the ‘circumstances of class’, were mounting a serious threat to 
the ‘politics of patronage’ in the DMA before 1914, somewhat earlier than 
suggested by Beynon and Austrin.70 That said, Lawson himself appeared to be 
in a radical phase in this period; his Methodism reasserted itself in far more 
moderate politics in the post-war period. Bolton’s Methodism, by contrast, did 
not dim his radical fervour. In 1919, for example, Bolton used his influence to 
secure a Methodist chapel as a venue for visiting revolutionary organiser T.A. 
Jackson to talk on ‘Isaiah the Bolshevik’.71 
 
In fact, these ILP Durham miner activists employed a good deal of the same 
rhetoric, and to advance similar immediate aims, as the syndicalists of South 
Wales. They were appealing to essentially the same disgruntled rank-and-file in 
their respective coalfields, but the Durham ILP activists were by some measures 
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more successful. Indeed, the DFM’s monopolising of this discontent was such 
that the revolutionary movement in the Durham coalfield remained relatively 
marginal.72 Thus the ‘anti-liberal minority’ (in reality, as argued above, a 
popular majority if the 1912 minimum wage strike votes are the yardstick) was 
not significantly (contrary to Tanner) ‘weakened by defections to syndicalism 
and the far left’ in Durham.73 Indeed, the Durham coalfield ILP was perfectly 
capable of maintaining more far left activists in its ranks, including some 
sympathetic to syndicalism. For example, in May 1912 George Jacques, a 
leading local ILP activist, welcomed ‘the advent of syndicalism or industrial 
unionism; their ideal is commendable. But I venture to think that several of our 
young men today will be grey haired and wrinkled before they can mend our 
surface workmen’s condition’.74 Evidently, moderation (attempting to blur the 
barriers with Liberals) was not necessarily the most promising, even less the 
only, path to success for Labour in Durham, especially not when it came to 
capturing the DMA from the Lib-Labs.75  
 
There were obvious tensions between these languages of class (including 
syndicalist languages), and the ‘ethical socialism’ of ILP leaders like Snowden 
and MacDonald. Indeed, MacDonald’s doubts about both trade unions and, 
indeed, the working-class, meant that the Durham ILP activists’ strategy of 
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fomenting rank-and-file movements was unlikely to have appealed to him. That 
said, Lawson’s writings promoting the Durham movement and his pamphlet on 
the minimum wage did receive national ILP coverage and backing.76 If these 
ILP activists were not standard ‘ethical socialists’, what were they? The 
popularity of the maverick socialist Victor Grayson among Durham miners 
offers some suggestions. Grayson was one of four guest speakers (elected by the 
lodges) for the 1909 and 1911 annual Durham miners’ galas. He was an ILP 
member whose candidature at Colne Valley parliamentary by-election, which he 
won in 1907, was opposed by the national ILP but endorsed by his local branch. 
Grayson has been regarded as rather shallow ideologically, and little more than a 
rabble-rouser. But his militant brand of socialism –Grayson’s 1912 gala speech 
included calling for solidarity action with striking Welsh miners and his attacks 
on labour movement leaders chimed with syndicalist critiques– appeared to 
resonate among sections of Durham miners.77 That said, the DFM’s emphasis on 
the need for a coherent Labour Party in parliament was at odds with Grayson’s 
wayward and undisciplined attitude to parliamentary work. Nevertheless, as 
with Grayson’s local ILP branch, the ILP in South Wales (which retained 
syndicalists among its membership for much of the pre-1914 period), and the 
DFM showed that the party was rather ideologically heterogeneous, and that the 
ethical socialism of its leaders, itself a rather flexible concept, was not 
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invariably articulated by its most significant grassroots activists in some distinct 
localities.78  
 
As problematic was Tanner’s conflating the politics of Durham ILP activists like 
DMA official Alderman House and Lawson, which obscured a crucial 
ideological cleavage in the Labour challenge.79 House’s politics –evident in, for 
example, speeches praising the Liberal government in 1912– remained far more 
accommodating towards the party House had only fairly recently left, than those 
of the DFM/ILP activists.80 Indirectly or directly, House was the butt of many 
DFM attacks and he responded in kind, albeit usually implicitly.81 The cleavage 
in Labour ranks was partly between the leaders (DMA full-time officials) and 
the led. It was even more evident from a second Labour-supporting DMA 
official, James Robson, who was openly aggressive towards his supposed 
Labour comrades in the DFM. At the 1912 miners’ gala, Robson reacted angrily 
to a pro-DFM speech by questioning the movement’s leaders’ integrity and 
loyalty. Disorder ensued.82  
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The cleavage within Labour was also partly generational. While House and 
Robson were born in 1854 and 1860 respectively, DFM leaders W.P. 
Richardson (1873) and Lawson (1881) were born significantly later. Indeed, 
contemporary commentators noticed both the political and age differences; by 
October 1912, the DFM leaders had been dubbed ‘the young men in a hurry’ by 
the northern press.83 A letter from an anonymous miner in the Durham 
Chronicle alleged the same division over the minimum wage vote, lamenting 
that boys aged eighteen were admitted as full DMA members and so could vote 
on these issues (and were more likely than their fathers to support striking).84 
Similarly, the Chief Inspector of Mines also observed the generational divide in 
Durham and the ‘more violent’ feature of the DFM rhetoric.85  
 
The final tangible (albeit indirect) DFM (and MWM) achievement was in 
catapulting several ILP activists to notoriety as champions of the militant rank-
and-file. This was particularly the case for DFM’s four main officials W.P. 
Richardson (DFM chair), Andrew Temple (secretary), Jack Lawson (assistant 
secretary and later secretary) and Henry Bainbridge (treasurer). None had their 
DFM positions contested and all emerged in 1912 or shortly after from part or 
total obscurity as main contenders for the top lodge-elected DMA positions 
including those on the Executive Committee.86 That the DFM was a very 
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effective vehicle in advancing specific ILP activists within the DMA can be 
observed in the minutes of lodges such as Marsden, which, after it became 
involved in the movement, began voting for DFM activists for DMA positions.87 
The DFM’s efficacy became even more apparent when Lawson and Richardson 
were placed among the five elected in a ballot for new DMA parliamentary 
candidates (from a field of seventy nominees) in April 1914. This vote was an 
unequivocal victory for the (generally) younger and unquestionably more 
militant Labour generation who led the DFM. Only one of the five elected (and 
the only DMA official) James Robson, represented the more conciliatory Labour 
tradition (and, unlike House, he had not been an official when the Eight Hours 
Agreement was signed).88 Remarkably, the other two elected and all five beaten 
candidates in the final ballot had been involved (albeit to differing degrees) in 
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the rank-and-file movements.89 The local press certainly equated the DFM 
leaders’ new prominence intimately with their activism in the DFM.90  
 
In the short-term, successfully getting its activists elected to the Executive 
potentially inhibited the DFM’s immediate room for manoeuvre and demanded 
a change of emphasis in its rhetoric. The DFM became far less overtly critical of 
the leadership (and keener to assert its loyalty and desire to strengthen the 
union) than was the MWM.91 This did not, however, prevent flash-points as the 
DFM’s opponents in the leadership, such as James Robson, were swift to seize 
on the apparent discrepancies surrounding activists who, as Executive members, 
had opportunities to air their grievances without having to resort to rank-and-file 
organisations.92 Somewhat awkwardly, Robson was standing next to these very 
people as he spoke at the DMA’s annual gala and the two sides rubbed 
shoulders and exchanged barbed remarks on gala platforms again in 1913.93 
Thus, far from beginning to heal the breach in Labour ranks, this situation 
further underscored the ideological gulf and considerable tension between the 
ILP/DFM activists and Labour DMA officials like Robson and House. 
Evidently, DFM leaders on the DMA Executive were in an awkward position, 
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but the 1914 PPC vote suggested that they had managed to avoid being deemed 




The reasons for the DFM’s failures both to act on certain issues and to achieve 
many of their stated aims play as important a role as its successes in providing a 
full and rounded understanding of political change in the coalfield. The DFM’s 
failures fall into two groups; those more specific to reforming the DMA and 
wider practical issues relating to mobilising the miners’ vote for Labour 
(considered in the next section). In terms of the former, one glaring apparent 
failure was that John Wilson, the single greatest obstacle to the ILP’s advance 
inside the union, continued in his powerful position apparently unhindered. This 
in itself suggested the continued strength of liberalism in the DMA. Given 
Wilson’s symbolic as well as actual importance it was perhaps surprising that 
the DFM made no major effort to remove him. Instead, it proposed ways to trim 
Wilson’s power, including abolishing his monthly circular ‘which is in the main 
an expression of personal opinion’.94 It advised replacing the monthly circular 
with either a magazine produced by its suggested new propaganda department or 
with reports from the officials of each DMA organisational department. It also 
proposed to throw Wilson’s position into doubt by introducing a new rule that 
no DMA official could be an MP simultaneously.95 The former idea was soon 
dropped and the latter also failed to make it into the DFM’s five proposed 
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reforms of October 1913. That said, several DFM-supporting lodges’ proposals 
did include a mechanism that precluded MPs from being officials 
simultaneously, though two of these effectively exempted Wilson from any 
changes and, in any case, none were passed.96 Indeed, Wilson tended not to be 
singled out for criticism from rank-and-file movement platforms even before the 
DFM halted its general criticism of the union’s leadership.  
 
There were several reasons for this, some born of the rank-and-file movement’s 
relative institutional weakness to Wilson’s strength. The latter was evident when 
Wilson and the other full-time officials survived (albeit very narrowly) a ‘no 
confidence’ vote over the Eight Hours Agreement in 1910. If the lodges would 
not remove Wilson over this, it seemed unlikely that anything could get him out.  
97 Wilson’s longevity also helped him. As the last remaining DMA founder 
member, Wilson enjoyed an elevated status, regarded as having served the 
Durham miners well in the past, irrespective of his more recent record. Even 
some self-proclaimed socialists, like Jos Ritson (checkweighman at 
Monkwearmouth), claimed Wilson was ‘head and shoulders above other miners’ 
leaders in the County’.98 From January 1912, Wilson liked to announce to 
appreciative crowds that he took no DMA salary at all.99 His years of experience 
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allowed him to wield skilfully the general secretary’s substantial powers. Wilson 
could influence the Executive, retained his personal mouthpiece (the monthly 
circular) and could call on massive financial backing (whereas his opponents 
had to raise their own finance) and so forth.100 His well-honed rhetorical and 
debating skills were well able to defuse or deflect the most vigorous of 
challenges. All Wilson’s rhetorical skills were on display in court when 
defending himself from revolutionary activist George Harvey’s accusations that 
he served the coal owners’ interests in October 1912. Wilson’s humorous 
responses made a mockery of Harvey’s reasoned arguments and detailed 
supporting evidence.101 It seems likely that all of Wilson’s experience -his 
ability to manipulate the rules and steamroller opposition- was deployed to great 
effect when DFM activists joined the Executive from 1912. An example of how 
the Executive (under Wilson’s guidance) could counter lodge influence came 
with the DFM’s claim that the results of a lodge vote taken on altering the 
DMA’s rules in early 1911 were made available as late as September 1911, 
giving lodges only twelve days to discuss a hugely complex document 
containing over 200 suggested rule-changes. The movement further claimed that 
‘hundreds’ of lodge resolutions had been suppressed (ruled ‘out of order’) by the 
leadership.102 There is undoubtedly no need to resort to a ‘form of conspiracy 
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theory’ to suggest that those in positions of power could find many means to 
subvert democratic processes if it suited them.103 
 
Yet, if DFM activists in the Executive suited Wilson, his remaining in office 
also, in some respects, served the DFM’s aim. Wilson cut an increasingly 
marginalised and anachronistic figure, repeatedly urging miners to remember 
their apparent common interests with the owners (who were busying themselves 
in finding increasingly ingenious means to deny their workers the minimum 
wage) and all the while fighting a rearguard action against the militants outside 
the Executive (if not in it). The DFM could try to reform the organisation around 
its general secretary (who was, in any case, proving difficult to dislodge), while 
working to improve its own standing in the hope of being best positioned to 
provide the replacement for a now elderly Wilson. With every pronouncement 
on the minimum wage and the industrial and political means to make it worth 
having, DFM activists struck a blow against Wilson and the politics he 
embodied.  
 
Indeed, in terms of debates around ideology, Wilson was the single most 
significant Liberal in the political world of most Durham miners. As a Liberal 
and an overt opponent of the minimum wage, Wilson emphatically could not be 
regarded by Durham miners as radical and responsive to material questions.104 
Wilson singularly failed to depict the minimum wage legislation as Tanner 
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claimed centrist Liberals did, ‘to combine the interests of local miners with 
ideologically “acceptable” forms of state intervention’.105 Indeed, Wilson was 
entirely incapable of adapting ideologically to the rapidly changing world 
around him. Yet, in 1910 and subsequently, Wilson was consistently re-elected 
at DMA annual meetings. This was in part because a section of Durham lodge 
leaders retained the same liberal values.  But, by 1911-12, it was clear that 
Wilson’s views were not shared by a significant and growing section of his 
members; the DMA members’ votes on the minimum wage showed this 
unmistakably.  
 
So, if the DFM did represent the majority of the rank-and-file by 1912, why was 
it unable to get so many of its proposed reforms passed by lodges and to tackle 
Wilson more effectively? The answer relates to debates around the issue of 
‘representation’. In essence, the DFM was institutionally under-represented in 
terms of lodge vote allocation. The DMA’s rule of a maximum of six votes for 
lodges with 750 members or more made no allowance for the ever-growing 
modern pits.106 Thus, by 1912, the DMA’s fiftieth largest lodge (with 791 
members) had the same six votes as the largest lodge with over three times its 
membership. This particularly disadvantaged the DFM as much of its strongest 
support came from the larger, under-represented lodges. At least twenty-two of 
the largest thirty DMA lodges were active in the DFM. They contributed 27 per 
cent of the DMA’s membership, but exercised only 18 per cent of votes on 
DMA council. Effectively the voting system greatly overrepresented smaller and 
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often more moderate lodges. Indeed, the larger lodges’ influence was further 
weakened when the 1911 annual meeting voted to divide the coalfield into six 
wards each electing two representatives to the Executive.107 At the 1913 annual 
meeting, seven of the largest thirty lodges (all involved in the DFM) made 
various suggestions for allocating extra votes for memberships over 750. But, as 
at several previous annual meetings, none of their proposals was endorsed.108 A 
voting system more proportionately related to lodge membership would have 
given DFM lodges a majority on DMA council. In this situation many more of 
the DFM’s proposed reforms would almost certainly have been successful.  
 
The DFM used the anomaly for propaganda purposes. A DFM circular 
complained in May 1912 that the DMA’s administration and rules were created 
when the membership was half its 1912 level.109 Further, the larger DFM lodges 
were clearly keen to address the issue (though it is difficult to determine if they 
had co-operated outside of the DFM). But the DFM itself did not explicitly call 
for any redistribution of votes to lodges more commensurate with their 
individual memberships and made no subsequent effort to co-operate on this 
apparently crucial representation issue. Quite why this was, considering the 
potentially significant advantages a victory in this area offered the DFM, is 
unclear. Perhaps the issue was not on the DFM’s agenda as its three most 
prominent lodges ranked among the smallest third of DMA lodges. With the 
rules as they stood, these lodges were effectively overrepresented in the DMA 
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and a change in vote allocation would have diminished the standing of the 
smaller lodges’ leaders. While this possible explanation casts the main DFM 
leaders, like Lawson, in a rather poor light, other reasons for this curious 
oversight do not readily suggest themselves. Thus, while the DFM was an 
alliance of smaller and larger lodges that often experienced quite different 
industrial relations, there remained potentially self-defeating tensions between 
them.   
 
A second dimension to ‘representation’ debates, however, apparently suggested 
that the ILP was overrepresented at lodge level. Roy Gregory argued that lodge 
votes ‘were notoriously unreliable guides to the general opinion of miners, 
particular on political questions’.110 This was because lodges cast all their votes 
in DMA council one way after most issues were decided by a single and 
probably poorly attended lodge meeting. Gregory argued that this allowed a 
dedicated ILP grouping to cast votes that the majority of any lodge’s passive 
membership did not endorse. Similar claims formed part of contemporary 
discourse. At the 1913 gala, Alderman House criticised rank-and-file apathy, 
claiming that it was ‘well known’ that all lodge business was being done by five 
or six per cent of members.111 Taken in context, this was a veiled suggestion that 
the DFM did not represent majority rank-and-file opinion.   
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There was a degree of truth in claims about low levels of lodge involvement, but 
two points require emphasis. First, this situation equally allowed for small 
organised groups of more moderate miners to exert the self-same 
unrepresentative control; and in at least one case against a more militant rank-
and-file majority feeling. The incident came in Marsden lodge, which had fairly 
well-balanced militant and more moderate factions active in the lodge 
committee whose influence ebbed and flowed. In November 1913, their relative 
strengths were finely poised, as the lodge meeting voted on issues that it might 
put to a full ballot of lodge members. The meeting’s vote twice tied on the issue 
of re-affiliating to the DFM and agreed on a third vote (by twenty-six to twenty-
four votes) to put the issue to the full membership. The membership then 
showed itself rather more supportive of the DFM than its lodge activists, voting 
503-314 in favour of (re-)joining it.112 In this example, lodge activists had come 
very close to preventing the membership from expressing its more militant 
stance. The scarcity of detailed lodge minutes means that other examples are not 
forthcoming, but there is no reason to think that Marsden was untypical of the 
larger, more modern Durham lodges. 
 
Second, Marsden provided an example of a wider process of democratisation of 
lodge politics as it had begun to ballot its full membership on the choice of 
lodge officials (as well as other selected issues). This was a relatively novel 
idea. Traditionally, lodge officials had been chosen by a show of hands at a 
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single meeting.113 The extent to which this practice was catching on is difficult 
to gauge, but by August 1914 six-monthly full lodge membership ballots elected 
officials in at least five other lodges.114 These more democratic lodges differed 
in size, age and location but at least four of the five actively supported the DFM. 
These lodge officials were undoubtedly more representative of and accountable 
to all their members though, naturally, an endorsement on union matters did not 
necessarily mean popular support for lodge officials’ political stances. Even if 
ILP groupings had, however, successfully hijacked some lodge committees and 
were unrepresentative of lodge members, the DFM still worked (to some extent 
successfully) to remove lodge committees’ powers and place them in the hands 
of all DMA members. This was undoubtedly more democratic. Furthermore, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that, for example, when the DFM called for an 
individual ballot for all full-time DMA officials, it anticipated (correctly as it 
turned out) this would favour its nominees at the expense of the Lib.-Labs. 
Indeed, another way of counteracting its lodges’ under-representation in the 
central DMA was to remove powers from lodge-level decision making and place 
them in the hands of the entire membership. This was clearly not the strategy of 
an organisation determined to capture and undemocratically wield lodge votes 
against the wishes of an essentially Liberal but hopelessly apathetic mass 
membership. In essence then, the ILP’s support through the DFM was greater 
than the sum of its successes, thanks in large part to the biases of the DMA’s 
institutional machinery. That said, the movement could probably have achieved 
more if it had acted with more unity in some areas. Nevertheless, even with 
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these difficulties, it is clear that the movement was crucial in building a Labour-
supporting culture inside the unions and in coalfield communities in the final 
pre-war years, as well as being central to democratisation debates and processes 




A second group of shortcomings relate to the DFM’s apparent inability to affect 
the miner vote. In spite of all its agitation, ordinary individual Durham miner 
voters continued to favour Liberals. As Tanner pointed out, Labour only 
managed third place in the two immediately pre-war County Durham by-
elections. In Houghton-le-Spring (1913) Labour got 26.2 per cent of the vote; in 
North-west Durham (1914), 28.9 per cent in constituencies with estimated miner 
electorates of 56 per cent and 61 per cent respectively (in 1910). The failure in 
North-west Durham was particularly striking as the constituency contained 
many rank-and-file movement supporting lodges and the DFM had by then won 
exclusive DMA support for Labour.115  
 
To what extent was the DFM culpable? Its leaders, if Lawson was 
representative, did not seem overly anxious to explore the forms of political 
action required to get more ordinary miners to vote Labour and the types of 
organisation required to effect this. Even Lawson, the Labour election agent in 
Jarrow in 1910, confessed to ignorance of electoral law and that he ‘knew little 
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of the technique of organisation’.116 That there was no party organisation in the 
constituency anyway meant Lawson was not overly self-reproachful for his 
political ignorance, though this attitude rather neglected to recognise the role of 
the organiser as that of making and running an organisation. Obviously, it was 
not the exclusive fault of DFM leaders and activists that in 1913 Houghton-le-
Spring had no Labour Party organisation to speak of. Yet Lawson was partly 
culpable in that in the area where he worked, the Labour stronghold of Chester-
le-Street, there was also no formal constituency organisation until 1914.117 That 
said, Lawson had been indefatigable in the DFM before this time, and getting 
the DMA’s formal support for Labour was merely one of the movement’s many 
aims. He had a legitimate excuse for a relative neglect of the more overtly 
‘political’ side of organising.  
 
Considering Lawson’s attitude (as a leading DFM activist most experienced in 
running political organisations), it was hardly surprising that miners’ lodges 
generally were not involved in their local Labour Representation Committees 
(LRCs). Both Gregory and Tanner emphasised lodge non-involvement in LRCs 
as evidence that Labour had far to go in Durham.118 In fact, lodges differed 
considerably on this question. Predictably, rather moderate lodges such as 
Andrew’s House showed no interest in the Labour Party or local LRC (or the 
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DFM).119 Yet in the case of Oxhill lodge, renewed activity in the DFM 
accompanied a new involvement in the LRC. Oxhill’s new interest in the DFM 
came in the wake of involvement in a coalfield-wide campaign against increased 
doctors’ fees in early 1913 (an effect of the Liberal government’s new National 
Insurance Act) in which many DFM lodges (though not the organisation itself) 
were heavily involved.120  
 
The relationships between support for the DFM and Labour Party can be traced 
in detail in Marsden lodge’s records. As Tanner noted, Marsden refused to join 
its local LRC on two occasions 1911–1913.121 But in between these two votes, 
support for affiliation to the LRC and/or Labour Party often grew. In April 1914, 
the tide turned decisively as a full lodge ballot voted (701 to 528) in favour of 
affiliating to Labour (a vote Tanner did not mention). Later attempts to reverse 
this decision were unsuccessful. Support for both the DFM and Labour in 
Marsden lodge fluctuated largely in sync, suggesting a strong relationship 
between the two (albeit with the DFM invariably better supported).122 Late 
spring 1914 might well have marked something of a turning point in terms of 
Durham lodge support for LRCs; the records of an unidentified lodge reveal 
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support for the DFM in early 1914 and a vote to affiliate to the constituency 
Labour Party in May 1914.123   
 
More generally, Marsden’s records illustrate the political flux in lodges in this 
period, as decisions were determined by the numbers that rival moderate and 
militant factions could turn out at any given lodge meeting. Nevertheless, it 
remained clear that the DFM struggled against a cultural tendency among lodges 
to ignore organisations (overtly ‘political’ and not) outside of the DMA. This 
was clear in Marsden’s records; two full lodge ballots in 1912 decisively 
rejected using lodge funds for both political and municipal purposes and in 
summer 1913 the lodge committee voted not to hold a full membership ballot on 
whether the lodge should affiliate to the Trades Council and the Workers’ 
Educational Association, among others.124 Indeed, it was noteworthy that some 
of the most significant victims of this tendency were on the industrial side of the 
movement: many lodges other than Marsden consistently refused to affiliate to 
local Trades Councils before 1914, a characteristic still observable in the 1930s. 
The DFM, firmly in and of the lodges, did not suffer directly as a result of this 
cultural tendency, but LRCs, to some extent, did.  
 
Clearly, activity in the industrial context did not necessarily automatically 
translate directly (and immediately) into a more overtly ‘political’ context; not 
without clear mechanisms for enabling any such transition. This was also 
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suggested by the fortunes of the Durham ILP’s organisation after 1911. While 
ILP activists had, in the words of Sunderland Labour MP, F.W. Goldstone, 
given ‘point and expression to the present unrest which was caused mainly by 
the wages question’, the ILP itself benefited only very modestly from its 
members’ activity in the rank-and-file movements.125 With well over 100 
branches by August 1914, the ILP was firmly established in the Durham 
coalfield, but only a handful, at best, of these branches was founded or re-
founded during or after 1911.126 Furthermore, ILP branches’ fairly even 
distribution throughout the coalfield, in areas that had both militant and more 
moderate controlled lodges, suggested only a weak relationship between ILPers 
active in lodge politics and the ILP operating in the more strictly ‘political’ 
sphere.127 Indeed, while Jack Lawson was regularly addressing ILP meetings at 
this time, the activity of ILP miner activists in general seemed heavily skewed 
towards the DFM. This could only tend to reinforce the cultural tendencies in 
miners’ lodges to remain relatively aloof from the forms of organisation and 
activity required to get uncommitted miners to vote Labour.  
 
In terms of qualifying the DFM’s culpability, specific aspects of both 
Parliamentary by-elections require comment. The DFM itself could hardlyhave 
been expected to mobilise in support of the three-shift system tainted House. As 
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it was, DFM lodges were heavily involved in the doctors’ fees agitation at the 
time the election was on, an issue which received far more local press column 
inches than the by-election. At Houghton-le-Spring a crucial determinant was 
the actual Labour candidate, Alderman House, and the area the constituency 
covered, which included Murton and the other three other large pits that had 
struck the longest against the changing shift system in 1910. As a DMA official, 
many miners held House responsible for the Eight Hours Agreement and the 
tremendous anger directed at him in the 1910 elections had not abated in 1913. 
House’s arrogant refusal to apologise and crude attempt to deflect the blame 
when speaking at Murton in the final days of the 1913 campaign merely 
inflamed the anger.128 A second important determinant was the Irish vote: a 
significant section of the electorate that was expected to vote solidly Liberal 
over the issue of Home Rule.  
 
Third was the ideological dimension, where House was again found wanting. 
Many of the lodges angriest at House were those most involved in the DFM and 
likely inclined towards a more militant brand of Labour politics than House 
offered. The Liberal choice of an unknown but radical candidate, Tom Wing, 
was, as Tanner claimed, a shrewd move.129 Wing was easily able to further blur 
the already narrow ideological gap with House by emphasising the ‘Lib.-Lab. 
party’ of which Wilson (and other north-east ‘miners’ champions’ Burt and 
Fenwick) were part.130 While Wing seemed ideologically little different to 
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House, his strength lay in offering hope for Irish voters on Home Rule and that 
he was not, unlike House, tainted over the three-shift system. Indeed, that House 
secured as much of the vote as he did was an achievement. This is not to deny 
that, as Tanner (and Gregory) claimed, lodges were split between Liberal and 
Labour at leadership and rank-and-file levels.131 But it remained clear that 
House’s poor showing was to a great extent a function of his low personal 
following; his role in the three-shift system in 1910 and his ideological inability 
to distinguish himself from the Liberals.  
 
In North-west Durham, the most mining-dominated constituency in the 
coalfield, a miner Labour candidate seemed a necessity. As such, MFGB leader 
Robert Smillie, thought to have a good chance by local ILP activists like Tom 
Richardson MP, was mooted as a possible candidate. Smillie was reluctant to 
stand and would not entertain doing so without the financial endorsement of the 
DMA, which he suspected would not be forthcoming.132 In the event, the Labour 
candidate was G.H. Stuart, secretary of the Postmen’s Federation, trying to 
appeal largely to miners (albeit he was a socialist).133 Furthermore, some 
significant non-mining sections of the working-class electorate, such as the Irish 
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steelworkers of Consett, were likely Liberal voters.134 Timing was crucial too. 
While the DMA was now formally committed to supporting Labour, this by-
election came too soon after the rule change. A DMA Executive meeting of 6 
January 1914 simply publicised a call for members to give Labour ‘their whole 
support’.135 The DFM, too, was inactive in this period. It was unfortunate that its 
‘No Minimum Wages in the Act - No Vote!’ campaign, a fairly sophisticated 
mechanism for influencing the Labour vote, did not appear until April 1914.136 
Before then, its energies had been understandably deployed elsewhere. Still, it 
was significant too that in August 1914 the DMA chose to sponsor a candidate 
in Houghton-le-Spring, partly encouraged by the amount of propaganda work 
done since House’s failure. That it did not even consider North-west Durham 
emphasised the continued lack of organisation there.137  
 
More speculatively, issues around the DFM’s support base were relevant to 
debates around the ‘franchise factor’.138 As far as can be gauged, the DFM 
tended to appeal most to younger miners who worked in the more modern, 
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larger pits.139 This chimes with Childs’ work on the generational component of 
Labour’s support. Childs argued that the twenty-one to thirty age group was 
more likely to identify with Labour than their parents and least likely to have the 
vote pre-war.140 Robert Moore also observed this phenomenon in the Durham 
coalfield.141  
 
There was also a strong generational element to the unofficial industrial 
militancy in the Durham coalfield. A wave of pit lad strikes (mostly unofficial), 
and largely by ‘putters’ (who shifted coal in tubs from the face to the surface), 
further intensified after 1910 period. These can be regarded as a youthful 
generational revolt, albeit in part determined by the Durham coalfield’s career 
pattern which meant that specific grades of workers were rather more defined by 
age than in most other British coalfields.142 Martin Daunton critiqued mining 
histories that placed ‘an emphasis upon […] the actions and ideology of the 
leadership, and a narrative of strikes’ in favour of understanding the underlying 
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‘social relationships of work’.143 In the case of Durham putters from 1910, 
however, strikes and social relations at work were rather closely related. The 
eight hour day had acutely altered the labour process in the Durham coalfield by 
lowering the earning potential of grades of underground pieceworkers like 
putters by reducing the length of their shifts. The extent to which this industrial 
militancy fed into growing support for Labour among the young putters of the 
Durham coalfield is difficult to establish; the DFM made no special attempts to 
address putters’ grievances as it had those of surfaceworkers and the elderly and 
infirm.  
 
Returning to the franchise, immigration was another significant consideration. 
Twelve months’ residence in one place was necessary to get onto the electoral 
register under the household qualification, so high levels of coalfield migration 
disenfranchised many. While the workforce turnover of settled collieries was 15 
to 20 per cent annually, in the newer pits, such as Chopwell, it was around 30 
per cent annually. High population turnover definitely helped to introduce and 
fortify left-wing ideas in pit villages like Chopwell.144 But it also meant that a 
higher proportion of the larger, more modern and generally more militant pits 
was less likely to qualify to vote.145 Miners more likely to support the DFM, and 
thus Labour, were therefore less likely to be able to vote before 1914, had they 
wanted to.  
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By August 1914 four DFM activists, who now so dominated among the next 
generation of elected DMA Prospective Parliamentary Candidates, had specific 
seats to contest.146 On the news of Lawson’s appointment as North-west 
Durham PPC, H. Sanderson Furniss, his lecturer at Ruskin College, told 
Lawson; ‘I always thought the Durham miners were sensible people and now I 
am sure of it’.147 The DMA’s political sub-committee was remarkably 
enthusiastic about its candidates’ prospects at Houghton-le-Spring (W.P. 
Richardson) and South Shields (Batey).148 Undoubtedly, the DMA’s resources 
were beginning to be brought to bear in terms of practical groundwork for 
Labour Parliamentary candidates, albeit in fewer constituencies than some of the 
more optimistic DFM activists wanted. 
 
DFM activists had to bide their time a little longer before taking official 
positions inside the DMA. But, when Wilson finally died in 1915, it was no 
coincidence that Richardson and Batey, two of his fiercest DFM critics, replaced 
him as full-time officials. They were the first officials elected on a ballot of all 
DMA members, one of the rule changes they had worked so hard to bring about 
through the DFM in 1913. These 1915 elections heralded a new era inside the 
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DMA. As the old guard Lib.-Lab. officials gradually died or retired, so 
candidates drawn from the DFM replaced them. All five of the DMA’s full-time 
officials elected between 1915 and 1934 (when Will Lawther was elected) had 
been involved in the DFM.149  
 
In terms of the rise of Labour debates, according the hitherto neglected rank-
and-file movements of the Durham coalfield a key explanatory role throws 
considerable new light on debates around political change. First, they show 
(contrary to Tanner) that the ILP achieved considerable political advances after 
the 1910 debacle in the Durham coalfield and that they did so operating 
essentially in the industrial sphere through the rank-and-file movements they 
formed and led. Indeed, the rank-and-file movements, and the DFM in 
particular, were the main vehicles for Labour’s advance inside the DMA from 
1911. With the DFM, the ILP had created a far more effective vehicle within the 
DMA than its own organisation alone could be.150 
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Second, the DFM allowed younger ILP activists to harness growing discontent 
in the coalfield over material conditions and the limp Lib.-Lab leadership with a 
message of industrial militancy which, by aping some syndicalist languages and 
ideas, outflanked the ILP’s revolutionary competitors in the coalfield. This 
ideology also clearly differentiated the ILP activists of the rank-and-file 
movements from an older guard of more moderate Labour activists already 
represented among the DMA’s full-time officials (chiefly House and Robson). 
While the politics of Labour-supporting officials like House undoubtedly did 
complicate the situation, as Tanner suggested, the successes of the DFM/ILP 
activists in elected positions (as PPCs and full-time officials 1914-15) reveal 
that they were not deemed culpable for leadership shortcomings. The DFM 
reveals that, again contrary to Tanner, a more militant and aggressive brand of 
politics could be articulated by ILP activists (notwithstanding the continuing but 
declining influence of Methodism) and, more importantly, that it was capable of 
galvanising majority support within the DMA membership. 
 
Third, their platform successfully channelled inchoate industrial discontent into 
growing support for a substantial and firmly independent Labour parliamentary 
presence. Indeed, the rank-and-file movements were essential to ensuring that 
what had been a paper victory for Labour in Durham when the MFGB affiliated 
to the party became a real victory. In amending the DMA’s rules to provide 
exclusive support for Labour, the DFM finally overcame the ambiguity that 
Wilson had engineered after 1908. More importantly, the ambiguity was 
surmounted by the rank-and-file movements actually convincing more ordinary 
DMA members of its message, evident in the growing support it garnered after 
the minimum wage was won in April 1912. Thus, when the revolutionary Irish 
 
  
trade unionist Jim Larkin urged the July 1914 DMA gala crowd to ‘for God’s 
sake’ let Labour ‘be independent and not connected with the flabby vindictive 
Liberal Party’, he was voicing the opinion of a majority of DMA members.151  
 
Fourth, the DFM’s campaigns effectively undermined both economic and 
political liberalism within the DMA. Liberals in the union, and most importantly 
the most influential Liberal John Wilson, were increasingly discredited and 
marginalised by their continued insistence that miners and owners shared 
interests. The institutional shifts inside the DMA, effected by the DFM and the 
direct result of growing rank-and-file pressure (and achieved with ILP lodges 
still constitutionally under-represented), indicated that the transfer of loyalties 
among DMA lodges and members was well advanced before the outbreak of 
war. In the short term, however, the struggle with the Liberals for ideological 
and actual control of the DMA was not over. The July 1914 miners’ gala elected 
Lloyd George among the four top choice speakers.152 Though the result of a 
disproportionate lodge voting system, this still represented a stubborn minority 
element of Liberal support within lodge leaderships and memberships.153 In 
1915, T.H. Cann, the most senior remaining official and a Liberal, replaced 
Wilson as general secretary and the DFM was soon agitating again, albeit now 
stripped of the leadership of Lawson, away fighting on Western Front. But the 
demographic of the DFM’s supporters who were, like many of its leaders, often 
 
151 Durham Chronicle, 31 July 1914. 
152 NEEMARC, NUMDA/1/6/39, ‘Gala speakers, 1914’, n.d.. 
153 For an individual example of continuing Liberalism among the Durham miners see L.H. 
Mates, ‘Charles Wilson, the Pitman’s Poet’, in K. Gildart and D. Howell (eds.), Dictionary of 
Labour Biography, Vol. XIII (2010), pp.372–381. 
 
  
miners too young or too mobile to qualify for the pre-1914 franchise, also 
suggested a strong generational element to potential Labour voters; the future 
lay with Labour in the post-war period. 
 
That said, the DFM’s record revealed some weaknesses; a continued political 
divide between the smaller, older lodges and more modern, larger, radical 
lodges that inhibited the movement’s ability to achieve all its aims inside the 
DMA. More importantly, the pre-war DFM did not pay much obvious attention 
to finding mechanisms for transforming hypothetical support for Labour in 
Parliament to actual votes for Labour candidates at elections, nor for 
overcoming the cultural reluctance among miners’ lodges to become involved in 
local LRCs. The DFM did belatedly (and understandably given it needed to win 
official DMA backing for Labour first) develop an electoral strategy cunningly 
tying miners’ material interests around improving the minimum wage to support 
for Labour candidates, but this could not be tested at a 1915 general election that 
never came.  
 
Furthermore, the militants still had to consider how to win over the non-trade 
union mining vote, still around a third of the entire mining workforce.154 
Theoretically, this task would become easier with the financial clout and 
tremendous prestige of the DMA behind them, and be further facilitated as the 
DMA extended its grip on the mining workforce in the war years and after. As 
Purdue wrote; ‘only control in the mining unions could seem to promise, given 
the geographical concentration of miners, a harvest of Parliamentary seats as a 
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corollary’.155 In practice, the relationship between DMA institutional support 
and securing Labour votes from Durham miners was rather complex. The 
DMA’s pre-war optimism over South Shields, for example, proved to be ill-
founded in the light of Labour’s inter-war record there (although the 
constituency had a small percentage of miner voters). Certainly, further research 
on the relationship between the industrial and more narrowly ‘political’ spheres 
and focussing on local and national elections in the Durham coalfield in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century is necessary.  
 
The rank-and-file movements by themselves do not offer a complete explanation 
for all the myriad processes involved in ‘political change’. Nevertheless, placing 
the ignored rank-and-file movements into the narrative of political change after 
1910 undoubtedly shifts the interpretation decisively towards viewing the 
ILP/Labour challenge as more fluid, vital, militant and effective in the Durham 
coalfield before the outbreak of war than has been recognised in the major texts. 
This is not, however, to endorse some crude sociological determinist version of 
the rise of Labour. Clearly, Labour was potentially threatened and was certainly 
not inevitably set to benefit from the industrial unrest that swept the coalfield 
1910–1914. As Joe White pointed out there was not a ‘zero sum’ relationship 
between organised labour’s gains in either the industrial or political sphere 
automatically meaning losses in the other. White suggested that both industrial 
and political socialist ‘tendencies might have grown together, despite the clear 
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and irreconcilable theoretical differences separating them’.156 The genius of the 
DFM/ILP leaders in Durham after 1910 was to take these apparently (and 
probably actually) irreconcilable tendencies and somehow weld them into what 
appeared, at least, to be a coherent whole, harnessing the discontent of often 
younger, more militant miners aggrieved with wages declining in real terms to 
steadfast, uncritical and oft-repeated support for the Labour Party in Parliament. 
They did this operating within formal organizations; the various governing 
institutions of the central DMA, in lodge-level politics and within their own 
rank-and-file organizations created specifically for the purposes of articulating 
their political and industrial demands. Their class-based rhetoric required this 
formal organization to be effective. The rank-and-file movement’s rhetoric 
certainly suggests that social class remains of value as one explanatory variable 
among several, especially in relation to how class languages could be framed 
and effectively deployed in period of socio-economic upheaval.157 Thus the ILP 
activists’ a agency is crucial to understanding the process of political change in 
the period; had they not acted as they did, the outcome in the Durham coalfield 
might have been far less favourable to the Labour Party’s future prospects. 
Clearly, this case study of Durham cannot, by itself, refute Tanner’s entire 
thesis. Yet, combined with other critical responses to Tanner’s work (discussed 
in the introduction) it certainly strongly suggests the need for more robust case 
studies. The debate around political change in Britain in the early twentieth 
century has some life left in it yet.  
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